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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CITIZENSHIP-POWER OF CONGRESS To
EFFECT INVOLUNTARY EXPATRIATION-In four recent cases the
United States Supreme Court has dealt with the power of Congress to effect the denationalization of native-born citizens without their consent. Three cases, Perez v. Brownell/ Trop v.
Dulles,2 and Mendoza-Martinez v. Jvf.ackey 3 dealt with the constitutionality of sections 40l(e), 40l(g) and 40l(j), respectively,
of the Nationality Act of 1940.4 The fourth case, Nishikawa v.
Dulles/' dealt only with the burden of proof when duress is alleged under section 40l(c), but contained one opinion of constitutional significance. The purpose of this comment is to analyze
and evaluate these decisions.

I. THE HOLDINGS

A. Perez v. Brownell
Perez v. Brownell involved two subsections of section 401 of
the Nationality Act of 1940. Those provisions read as follows:
"A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . .
" (e) voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the
sovereignty over foreign territory; or ...
"(j) departing from or remaining outside of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or during a
period declared by the President to be a period of national
emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training
and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States...."
Petitioner in the case was born in Texas in 1909 and moved
to Mexico in 1919 or 1920. He learned in 1928 that he had been
born in Texas, and knew of his duty in World War II to register
for the draft but failed to do so. He voted in a political election
in 1946, apparently for Mexico's president.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for Justices Brennan, Burton,
Clark and Harlan held that subsection (e) was constitutional
356 U.S. 44 (1958).
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
3 356 U.S. 258 (1958).
4 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), as amended, 8
V, 1958) §148l(a)(9).
5 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
1

2

U.S.C.

(1952) §1481, as amended, 8

U.S.C. (Supp.
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and that under it petitioner had lost his citizenship. They did
not pass on the validity of subsection (j). After reviewing statutory and administrative history and international usages, 6 Frankfurter first argued that Congress has the inherent power to deal
with foreign affairs as an attribute of sovereignty. He then stated
that the constitutional test was whether withdrawing citizenship
bore a reasonable relationship to the regulation of foreign affairs
and found that included within the foreign affairs power was
the power to deal with the voting of American citizens in foreign
elections because such voting might well be a source of embarrassment to our government. He argued that a reasonable method of achieving that end was to divest the voter of citizenship,
because termination of citizenship terminates the problem, and
further that it was "not without significance" that Congress had
found that such conduct involved "elements of an allegiance to
another country in some measure, at least, inconsistent with
American citizenship." 7 The Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed in a footnote. 8 Frankfurter finally argued that while
Mackenzie v. Hare 9 and Savorgnan v. United States10 indicate
that citizenship can be destroyed only for voluntary conduct,
it is unnecessary for that conduct to evince an intent on the
part of the citizen to expatriate himself.
Chief Justice Warren wrote the principal dissenting opinion
in which Justices Black and Douglas joined. While apparently
accepting the doctrine of inherent power, he argued that since
the government derives its power from the consent of the
governed, it has no power to destroy the relationship that gives
rise to its existence. He emphasized, however, that a citizen may
voluntarily expatriate himself and that the constitutional test
for questioning the subsection's validity was therefore "whether
the conduct it describes invariably involves a dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment
of citizenship." 11 Under this test he found the statute inadequate because the election might be a relatively insignificant
one or because the voting might have been legal in the foreign
country. Mackenzie v. Hare was distinguished as involving only
His historical survey went no further back, however, than 1868.
v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 61 (1958).
s Id. at 58, note 3.
9 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
10 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
11 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 75 (1958).
6

7 Perez
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a suspension of citizenship during coverture, and both that case
and Savorgnan v. United States were distinguished as meeting
the test the Chief Justice proposed, since in both the citizen
acquired another allegiance.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented, arguing
that while the Fourteenth Amendment absolutely granted citizenship to one born here, no power is found in the Constitution
to destroy that citizenship. He emphasized that both Mackenzie
and Savorgnan involved the acquisition of another citizenship,
and would place citizenship in the constitutionally preferred
position he presently feels First Amendment freedoms occupy
since "it is a grant absolute in terms."
Justice Whittaker in a "memorandum" expressly accepted
the premise of Frankfurter's opinion, but argued that since the
voting could have been legal in Mexico, it bore no rational
nexus to embarrassment of foreign affairs or to a dilution of
allegiance to this country.
B. Trop v. Dulles

Trop v. Dulles involved subsection (g):
". . . deserting the military or naval forces of the United
States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by
court martial and as the result of such conviction is dismissed or dishonorably discharged from the service of such
military, air, or naval forces .... "
Petitioner had deserted for one day in 1944 while serving
in the Army in Morocco. He had voluntarily turned himself in
and had not deserted to the enemy. Chief Justice Warren wrote
the principal opinion, speaking for Justices Black, Douglas and
Whittaker. The Chief Justice first reaffirmed his argument in
Perez, and would find this statute unconstitutional for, since
desertion to the enemy was not involved, the conduct showed no
dilution of allegiance_ to this country. As a second ground for
his opinion, Warren argued that the statute was penal in character, and after assuming that it bore a rational relationship to
the congressional exercise of the war power, found that it was
a "cruel and unusual punishment" within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. 12
12 U.S. CONST., Amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
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Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred, arguing
that in any case citizenship could not be divested on the finding
of a military tribunal.
Justice Brennan concurred separately and it was his shift
which caused subsection (e) to be upheld while subsection (g)
was struck down. He argued that there was no rational connection between the war power and expatriation following desertion within the Perez test. He found first that denationalization
for desertion was a penal clause, second that it did not aid in
rehabilitating the prisoner, third that it did not deter desertion
since it was a less strong sanction than the death penalty which
could be imposed for desertion and fourth that it was irrational
since some technical desertions bear no reiation to conduct even
faintly disloyal.
Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Burton,
Clark and Harlan: Frankfurter first argued that the subsection
bore a rational relationship to the war power, and that Congress
could have supposed that it would help military commanders
maintain discipline and morale. Frankfurter then argued that
this was a "non-penal" purpose, but that even assuming arguendo
that it was punishment, the Eighth Amendment was not transgressed since it could not be "seriously urged that loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death," 13 a punishment which could
clearly be applied to a deserter.

C. Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey
Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey involved subsection G) previously quoted which was left open in Perez. In this case petitioner left the United States in 1942 apparently for the purpose
of avoiding the draft, and did not return until 1946. Upon his
return he was convicted of draft evasion.14 Petitioner brought an
action for a declaratory judgment that he was a citizen. The
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion vacated the judgment
against him and "remanded [the cause] to the United States
District Court for determination in light of Trop v. Dulles. ..." 15

13 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 125
14 54 Stat. 894 (1940), as amended, 50

(1958).
U.S.C. App. (1952) §462. See Mendoza-Martinez
v. Mackey, (9th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 239.
lei Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey, 356 U.S. 258 (1958).
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D. Nishikawa v. Dulles
In Nishikawa v. Dulles, Chief Justice Warren, speaking for
Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas and Whittaker, held that when
duress is raised as a defense under section 40l(c), which includes
". . . entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state
unless expressly authorized by the laws of the United States,
if he has or acquires the nationality of such foreign state ... ,"
the government has the burden of proving that the petitioner
acted voluntarily. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Burton,
concurred separately and would limit the holding to cases where
the petitioner was inducted by command of a penal statute.
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, dissented, arguing that
the one alleging duress should have the burden of proving it,
particularly when as here the facts were almost exclusively with
the knowledge of petitioner.
The opinion in that case of interest in this inquiry was a
concurring opinion of Justice Black in which Justice Douglas
joined. Black argued that Congress had no power to destroy
citizenship, whether for acts bearing a rational nexus to some
substantive power or for acts showing a transfer of allegiance.
In his view the question was always whether an individual himself intended to relinquish his citizenship, and Congress could
do no more than establish rebuttable presumptions that certain
acts evidenced that intent. To the extent that they held to the
contrary, Mackenzie v. Hare and Savorgnan v. United States
should be overruled.

E. Con-fl,ict of Judicial Philosophy
Throughout the cases ran a thread of disagreement as to
the basic policy the Court should follow in reviewing acts of
Congress.16 Frankfurter continuously advocated a policy of judicial restraint in the Holmesian tradition: "The awesome power

16 Compare Frankfurter's opinion in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 62: "To deny
the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here would be to disregard
the constitutional allocation of governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn
duty to guard" with Douglas' dissent (at 79): "The philosophy of the opinion that sustains
this statute is foreign to our constitutional system," and Black's concurrence in Nishikawa
v. Dulles, note 5 supra, at 139: "In my view the notion that citizenship can be snatched
away whenever such deprivation bears some 'rational nexus' to the implementation of
a power granted Congress by the Constitution is a dangerous and frightening proposition."
To the effect that some caustic asides accompanied the delivery of the opinions, see
N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1958, p. 17:2.
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of this Court to invalidate such legislation, because in practice
it is bounded only by our own prudence in discerning the limits
of the Court's constitutional function, must be exercised with
the utmost restraint."17 Warren, on the other hand, asserted the
Court's power and responsibility to enforce the Constitution's
prohibitions as it understood them: "Courts must not consider
the wisdom of statutes but neither can they sanction as being
merely unwise that which the Constitution forbids .... When the
Government acts to take away the fundamental right of citizenship, the safeguards of the Constitution should be examined with
special diligence." 18
IL

RELEVANT HISTORY19

In the view of early English common law, allegiance was
indissoluble even with the consent of the sovereign. The citizen
was born with a tie to his government that only an act of Parliament could destroy. 20 Voluntary expatriation was an unknown
concept. As a concomitant of a citizen's duty to his country,
however, was the concept of the sovereign's duty to the citizen,
apparently developed in this country as a justification and explanation for the Declaration of Independence and the Revolutionary War. 21 Thus it was argued that the English Government,
by its illiberal conduct toward its colonies, had forfeited the
right to have their perpetual allegiance.
After the Revolution, there developed a decided split in
American thinking. One group, led by Thomas Jefferson and
with the American Revolution immediately before them, argued
that voluntary expatriation was a natural right, and that the
colonists in rebelling from the English despotism had merely
exercised it. Thus Jefferson was apparently the drafter of the
Virginia legislation which first gave a right (or expressed a mode
for its exercise) to a state citizen to expatriate.22
His view was met with considerable opposition, however,

17 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 128 (1958).
1s Id. at 103.
19 That historical ,background which bears on the constitutional question has been
emphasized. For a general discussion, see the authorities cited in notes 20, 21, 23, 25,
44, 48, 50 and 58 infra.
20 COCKBURN, NATIONALITY 63, 64 (1869); Slaymaker, "The Right of the American
Citizen to Expatriate," 37 AM. L. REv. 191 at 192, 193 (1903).
21 Dutcher, "The Right of Expatriation," 11 AM. L. R.Ev. 447 at 448-451 (1877).
22 See TSIANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 26 (1942).
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from, as might be expected, Alexander Hamilton. Hamilton
argued that the Jefferson doctrine was "an altogether new invention unknown and inadmissible in law."23 Quite naturally, since
most states had adopted the common law of England and since it
did not provide for voluntary expatriation, it was thought that
Jefferson's doctrine was not a part of our law. Judicial decisions
as they developed were in some conflict although they generally
supported the more conservative views of Hamilton.24
The adoption of the Constitution brought with it one other
problem, not ultimately settled until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment: was there a separate United States citizenship or was it merely derivative from state citizenship?25 The
feeling that citizenship was predominately a state matter was
partially responsible for the defeat of one of the first attempts to
pass a federal statute detailing a mode for exercising the right
of voluntary expatriation.26
This brief examination of early historical attitudes is important to our problem not for the controversies that were involved, but for those that were not involved. That is, at the
time of adoption of the Constitution, the right or power of the
government to effect involuntary expatriation was not a burning
issue, or even an issue at all. The problem simply was not raised,
presumably because no one at that time thought that the government should or did have the power to divest a citizen of his citizenship.27 Therefore, to the extent which a thing not considered
can be said to have been permitted or denied by the Constitu23 Quoted in Morrow, "The Early American Attitude Toward the Doctrine of Expatriation," 26 AM. J. INT. L. 552 at 554 (1932).
24 Sec cases discussed in Slaymaker, "The Right of the American Citizen to Expatriate," 37 AM. L. R.Ev. 191 (1903).
25 See ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (1949).
26 Roche, "Loss of American Nationality: The Years of Confusion," 4 WEST. PoL. Q.
268 at 276 (1951).
27 Thus, in the 1818 debates discussed in the text infra, Anderson of Kentucky
argued: "Although •the intention with which [the bill to provide a means of exercising
the right of voluntary expatriation] was introduced, and the title of the bill declare
that it is to insure and foster the right of the citizen, the direct and inevitable effect of
the bill, is an assumption of power by Congress to declare that certain Acts when committed shall amount to a renunciation of citizenship." 1 ANNALS OF CoNG., 15th Cong.,
1st sess., p. 1039 (1818). Lowndes of South Carolina argued similarly: "If yon pass this
bill, said he, you have only one step further to go, and say that such and such acts shall
be considered as presumption of the intention of the citizen to expatriate, and thus take
from him the privileges of a citizen." Id. at 1050. The supporters of the measure clearly
had no such intention, and Cobb of Georgia answered Lowndes' argument: "It is to
remove any difficulties arising from such presumption, that this law is introduced." Id.
at 1068.
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tion, it is arguable that the power to cause forfeiture of citizenship was denied.
Apparently the first thorough28 consideration of the power
of Congress to effect expatriation was in the House debates surrounding the attempt in 1818 to adopt the federal measure
previously mentioned detailing a method for exercising the
right of voluntary expatriation.29 Although the measure had the
support of several representatives, and most apparently favored
the right itself, many felt that even its modest terms exceeded
the constitutional power of Congress. Thus Pindall of Virginia
argued: "The power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization
cannot be made to comprehend the power to change the law
of expatriation." 30 Lowndes of South Carolina expressed a similar sentiment: "[I]f the Constitution had intended to give to
Congress so delicate a power, it would have been expressly
granted," 31 as did McLane of Delaware: "It will not be contended
that the power in question is expressly given; . . . and . . . it is
not necessary to the execution of any express power."32 Abbott
of Georgia argued to the same effect: "The people have delegated
no power to Congress to define a rule for expatriation." 33 Williams of North Carolina also felt the act would be unconstitutional: "The framers of the Constitution would also have found
inseparable objections, against the exercise of this power by
Congress, from the nature of our political institutions," 34 and
he emphasized that citizenship was essentially a state concern.
Cobb of Georgia, however, thought the act constitutionally supportable: "In my opinion, it is clearly incidental to the power

28 But see TsIANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 37-43 (1942) for a
discussion of two previous House debates.
29 "That, whensoever any citizen of the United States shall, by a declaration in
writing, made and executed in the district court of the United States, within the state
where he resides, in open court, to be •by said court entered of record, declare that he
relinquishes the character of a citizen, and shall depart out of the United States, such
person shall, from the time of his departure, be considered as having exercised his right
of expatriation, and shall thenceforth be considered no citizen." I ANNALS OF CoNG.,
15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1054 (1818). The statute, it will be seen, assumed a "right of
expatriation," and was concerned merely with providing a means of exercising it.
30 I ANNALS OF CONG., 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1045 (1818). Anderson of Kentucky
argued that the existence of a power to naturalize "furnishes evidence, negatively, that
[the power to prescribe a manner of expatriation] was omitted from design, and not from
inattention." Id. at 1037.
31 Id. at 1050.
32 Id. at 1057.
33 Id. at 1087.
84 Id. at 1079.
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of establishing 'an uniform rule of naturalization.' It necessarily
results from it-it is, indeed, a correlative power.''35 Johnson of
Kentucky also appeared to support the constitutionality of the
measure.36 After being amended several times the act was ultimately defeated. In commenting on these debates, Tsiang, whose
book makes a significant contribution in this area, observed:
"In the course of debate and maneuvering it became evident that most of the speakers were in favor of allowing
expatriation, though they also felt that Congress had not
been delegated the power to act on the matter and that
federal regulation would infringe upon states' rights. At
first, the trend of the voting was toward acceptance of the
proposed principle. The entire proposal was dropped only
after the majority of the House became convinced that the
measure was definitely unconstitutional.'' 37
These debates must be viewed with caution. The makeup
of the House in 1818 certainly was not identical with the makeup of the Constitutional Convention. In our system it is generally
considered that the courts rather than the legislature determine
the meaning of our fundamental law. The debates were held
at a time when principles of constitutional construction were
much stricter than they have evolved to be. Nevertheless they
should not be disregarded, particularly since all parts of the
Constitution which could be alleged to give Congress the power
to denationalize were then in existence. Moreover the constitutional doubts were expressed as to providing a means for effecting voluntary expatriation and would presumably have been far
greater if the legislation had concerned forfeiture. 38 Finally,
representatives in 1817 probably were not completely out of
touch with the frame of reference of those who drafted the
Constitution.
The view that the power to prescribe uniform rules for
naturalization did not give Congress the power to effect expatriation was given powerful support by Chief Justice Marshall's
dictum in 1824 in Osborn v. Bank of the United States:
"He [the naturalized citizen] becomes a member of the
society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and
35 Id. at
36 Id. at

1067.
1043.

37 TSIANG, ExPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO

supra.
38 See

note 27 supra.

1907, 60-61 (1942). See also note 26
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standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of
a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to
enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of the
national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of
naturalization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it,
so far as respects the individual." 39
Of course the statement was mere dictum, but in the emphasized
portions the Chief Justice seemed to assume that the power to
abridge the rights of citizens, if one existed, must be implied
from the power to naturalize, but that no such implication could
be drawn from that power.40
The question whether a right of voluntary expatriation existed
in a United States citizen continued as previously indicated.
Courts generally tended to deny the right (the federal courts
usually on ambiguous grounds) and administrative practice vacillated.41 A strong position was taken by Buchanan in the 1840's
while secretary of state, although abandoned by succeeding secretaries. It was reasserted when Buchanan became president, 42
with an opinion of Attorney General Black in the case of Christian Ernst being particularly notable. 43 The position was not
vigorously asserted during the civil war, primarily because we
were in the position other countries had previously been in,
that of asking for the return of our citizens who had sought
refuge from our draft laws in another country. 44 Following the
war, however, a controversy concerning the imprisonment by
Britain of former Irish citizens who had been naturalized ensued
and the result was the passage in 1868 of an act which declared
that it is a "fundamental principle of the Republic" that "the
right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all
people."45 Whether this act had any legal effect is at least questionable,46 although some courts apparently applied it,47 but

39 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 at 827 (1824). Emphasis added.
40 But see 64 YALE L. J. 1164 at 1184 (1955).
41 See note 24 supra; generally Flournoy, "Naturalization and

L.

Expatriation," 31 YALE

J. 702 (1922).
42 See

generally Moore, "The Doctrine of Expatriation," 110

HARP.

Mo. MAG. 225

(1905).

43 9

Op. Atty. Gen. 356 at 357, 358 (1859).
TS!ANG, EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, 83, 84 (1942); Moore, "The
Doctrine of Expatriation," 110 HARP. Mo. MAG. 225 at 230, 231 (1905).
45 15 Stat. 223 (1868).
46 Dutcher, "The Right of Expatriation," 11 AM. L. R.Ev. 447 at 474-476 (1877).
47 E.g., In re Look Tin Sing, (C.C. Calif. 1884) 21 F. 905 (dictum).
44
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its main usefulness was in furnishing the basis for secunng
treaties with foreign countries in which a reciprocal right of
expatriation was recognized. 48 It should be emphasized that its
thrust was only to recognize the long-disputed right of a citizen
voluntarily to expatriate himself, although the methods by which
he might do so were not defined.
Just prior to this, in 1865, Congress, partly in response to
the dilemma mentioned above of asserting a claim to our citizens
who were avoiding our draft while denying ¢.e claim of other
governments to their citizens who had become naturalized in
this country for evading military service in their native country,
and partly in response to a general feeling of revulsion to those
Americans who refused to do their military duty, 49 passed an
act providing for the forfeiture of the "rights of citizenship"50
of persons who deserted beyond the borders of the United
States.51 The act apparently was one primarily of expediency and
received no serious constitutional attention.
About this same time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed
providing that " [a]II persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States... ," 52 Thus a personal status, that of citizenship,
was conferred by a constitutional grant. At least two questions
arise from this clause: whether it by implication permits Congress to destroy citizenship obtained through its operation, and
whether it by implication prohibits Congress from destroying
citizenship under -other powers it might have. Frankfurter apparently answered the latter question in the negative by dismissing it in a footnote in Perez. 53 The first, however, was answered
adversely to congressional power in United States v. Wong Kim
Ark. There the Court said:
"The power of naturalization, vested in Congress by the
Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power
to take it away. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment, while it
Borchard, "Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation," 25
INT. L. 312 (1931).
49 Note 44 supra.
50 See discussion of this term in Roche, "The Loss of American Nationality-The
Development of Statutory Expatriation," 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 25 at 61, 62 (1950). Compare,
in a different statutory context, In re Watson's Repatriation, (E.D. III. 1941) 42 F. Supp.
163, with In re Shee Mui Chong Yuen's Repatriation, (D.C. Hawaii 1944) 73 F. Supp. 12.
51 13 Stat. 490 (1865).
52 U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV.
53 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 58, note 3 (1958).
48

AM.

J.
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leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship. "54
If, as was implied in Chief Justice Marshall's dictum in Osborn/' 5
which was quoted by the Court in Wong Kim Ark, the only
power to denationalize must be derived from the power to naturalize, then the quoted statement also answers the second question contrary to the answer given by Justice Frankfurter. This
follows because if the only basis for authority prior to the Fourteenth Amendment lay in the power to naturalize, and none lay
there, and the Fourteenth Amendment granted none, then none
exists. The question whether the above-quoted .statement from
Wong Kim Ark was dictum therefore becomes quite important
and the commentators are divided. 56 The case involved the citizenship status of a Chinese person born in this country and the principal argument was that he was not "subject to the jurisdiction"
of this country. A subsidiary point was raised that the Chinese
Exclusion Acts and a treaty with China had made Chinese not
subject to naturalization, thus excluding them from the operation
of the amendment. The Court held generally that "subject to
the jurisdiction thereof" meant no more than subject to the laws
of this country, and that appellee was subject to our laws when
born, but answered the latter argument also in the omitted portion of the previously quoted excerpt:
"Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no
act or omission of Congress, as to providing for the naturalization of parents or children of a particular race, can
affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the
Constitution itself, without any aid of legislation." 57
Therefore, the arguments run either that the basic holding
mooted the other question, making an expression of opinion on
54

169 U.S. 649 at 703 (1898).
Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824).

55 9

56 Compare Hurst, "Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?" 29 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
62 at 78, 79 (1956) (holding), with 21 UNIV. CIN. L. REv. 59 at 63 (1952), and Roche, "The
Loss of American Nationality-The Development of Statutory Expatriation," 99 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 25 at 26, 27 (1950) (dictum).
57 Note 54 supra.
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it mere dictum, or that the latter argument was necessary to
refute the contention that Congress had by statute taken a group,
i.e., the Chinese, out from under the normal operation of the
first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Which of these contentions is accepted would seem to depend on whether or not the
claim that a later statute can destroy an expressly granted cons~itutional status is considered wholly frivolous. Since in essence
Perez held that a later statute had precisely that effect, apparently
it cannot be considered frivolous, with the result that the two
quoted statements must be considered necessary to the opinion
and must be considered overruled sub silento by Perez. The only
thing that can be said with certainty is that the Fourteenth
Amendment problem deserved more than a footnote reference
in the majority opinion.
Following the two statutes and the constitutional amendment passed in the 1860's, the administrative branch of the
government found itself deciding cases on an ad hoc basis with
virtually no guidance from Congress. 58 Finally, following an
extensive study of the problem by three representatives of the
state department,59 the Act of March 2, 1907 resulted. 60 In the
act in relation to native-born citizens, Congress provided: "That
any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself
when he has been naturalized in any foreign state in conformity
with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of allegiance to any
foreign state." 61 This provision seems merely to provide a method which a citizen desiring to expatriate himself may use to do
so, and fills the-vacuum left by the 1868 act. The Report of the
Sta~e Department confirms this suggestion. 62
Only one other provision related to loss of citizenship by a
native-born citizen, section 3 of the act:
" ... That any American woman who marries a foreigner
shall take the nationality of her husband. At the termination
of the marital relation she may resume her American citizenship, if abroad, by registering as an American citizen within
one year with a consul of the United States, or by returning
58 See Flournoy, "Naturalization and Expatriation," 31 YALE L. J. 702 and 848 (1922);
Roche, "Loss of American Nationality: The Years of Confusion," 4 WEST. PoL. Q. 268
at 287 et seq. (1951).
59 H.R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess. (1906).
60 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
61 Id., §2.
62 H.R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess., p. 23 (1906).
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to reside in the United States, or, if residing in the United
States at the termination of the marital relation, by continuing to reside therein." 63
It will be noted that, unlike the other section quoted, there is
no mention of expatriation. Further, section 3 speaks in terms
of resuming her citizenship, which appears to indicate that it
was held in abeyance, so to speak, during coverture. This is
made clear by the State Department report which did not consider this question under the heading "Expatriation" as the
previous section quoted was, but under the heading, "Effect of
Naturalization Upon .Status of Wife and Minor Children." 64
Further the initial sentence of the first recommendation under
this heading stated "[t]hat an American woman who marries a
foreigner shall take during coverture the nationality of her husband. . . ." 65 Finally, it should be noted that the statute is nonsense from the point of view of international law, for certainly
as to other states, American law cannot decree that a woman
"shall take the nationality of her husband." Only the laws of
the state of which the husband is a citizen can do that. 66 The
phraseology of the statute, however, undoubtedly disguised the
possible result under its operation-that of turning American
citizens while coverture lasted into virtually stateless persons.
That statute came before the Supreme Court in 1915 in
Mackenzie v. Hare. 61 Mrs. Mackenzie was a native-born citizen
who married an alien and continued to live in the United States.
She was refused the right to vote by the Board of Election Commissioners of San Francisco and brought a ·writ of mandamus
to compel it to register her. The court affirmed denial of the writ.
After stating in dictum that the government may have inherent
power to deal with foreign states, a power under which Mrs.
Mackenzie's status could be regulated, the Court said:
"There need be no dissent from the cases cited by plaintiff [Osborn and Wong Kim Ark, among others]; there
need be no assertion of very extensive power over the right
of citizenship or of the imperative imposition of conditions

63 Note 60 supra.
64 See H.R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 23,
65 Id. at 29. Emphasis added.
66 See the argument of Williams of North Carolina

CONG., 15th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1084 (1818).
67 239 U.S. 299 (1915).

29 (1906).
in the 1818 debates, 1 ANNALS
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upon it. It may be conceded that change of citizenship cannof be arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the
concurrence of the citizen." 68
The Court then held that in view of the historical unity of man
and wife, that after her voluntary acceptance of his ·citizenship
by her marriage, that "as long as the relation lasts it is made
tantamount. to expatriation." (Emphasis supplied.) The emphasized portions of the sentence support the construction of the
act previously ~uggested.
What does the opinion mean in relation to the principal
cases? It- probably is not a controlling precedent, for carefully
read in conjunction with the statute, it does not involve full
expatriation. Apparently a residuum of citizenship must remain even during marriage, for citizenship in the case of a widow
living in the United States is resumed by doing nothing at all.
Chief Justice Warren therefore seems to be correct in his reading of the actual holding of the case. 69 Justice Frankfurter, however, is also surely right when he suggests that the case stands for
the proposition that citizenship can be affected by acts which
are not intended to affect American citizenship. Black tacitly
recognizes this when he suggests in his dissent in Nishikawa
that Mackenzie must be overruled if his thesis that citizenship
must always turn on the intent of the individual is to prevail.
Nevertheless, since British citizenship was acquired by the marriage under the Naturalization Act, 1870, section 10(1),70 the
case also supports Warren's thesis that the act must indicate
"derogation of undivided allegiance ..." before citizenship may
be affected. It would seem therefore that it was not determinative of the recent cases; it did not involve true involuntary expatriation, and in any case its holding can be used to support the
thesis of either the majority or minority.
No significant further legislative activity occurred until 1940
when Congress made a sweeping revision of the nationality laws
generally. In the Nationality Act of 1940, with the possible exception of the ambiguous 1865 act involving the loss of "rights
of citizenship" for desertion, Congress provided for involuntary
complete loss of citizenship for the first time. The act is presently
68 Id.

at 311.
Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 69-73 (1958).
c. 14. See VAN Prrnus, NATIONALITY WITHIN
NATIONS 81-83 (1930).
69 Perez v.
70 33 Viet.,

OF
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recodified m the Imm1gration and Nationality Act of 1952.71
Before returning to the recent cases under consideration,
brief mention must be made of Savorgnan · v. United States. 72
In that case a native-born woman, wishing to marry an Italian
diplomatic official, signed a paper written in Italian, which she
did not understand, but which contained both a renunciation
of United States citizenship and an acquisition of Italian citizenship. Without deciding whether the 1907 or the 1940 act governed, the Court held that she had been expatriated. She apparently did not intend to lose her American citizenship, but did
know that the document concerned citizenship and that she
was acquiring Italian citizenship. This case then would also support the positions of both Frankfurter and Warren-the woman
did not subjectively intend to lose her citizenship, but her voluntary act in acquiring Italian citizenship indicated a transfer
of allegiance.

III.

ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT CASES

A. Inherent Power
Neither of the cases, Mackenzie and United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.,73 cited to sustain the proposition that the
government has inherent power as an attribute of sovereignty
to deal with foreign affairs, directly supports that proposition.
As previously indicated, the statements in Mackenzie to that
effect were clearly dictum. In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland's argument generally went, not to proving that the g01.1ernment had inherent power, but that the President had inherent
power and exercised a broad discretion in the matter of foreign
affairs. 74 Moreover, the holding is not consistent with the conventional doctrine that ours is a federal government of delegated
powers.75
Nevertheless the inherent power argument had been accepted
71 Note 4 supra.
72 338 U.S. 491 (1950).
73 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
74 See Riesenfeld, "The

Power of Congress and the President in International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Decisions," 25 CALIF. L. REv. 643 at 665-669 (1937);
generally PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND 221-232 (1951) and SCHWARTZ, THE SUPREME
CoURT 81-86 (1957). Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 at 295 (1936).
75 Compare Patterson, "In re the United States v. the Curtiss-Wright Corporation,"
22 TEX. L. ~ • 286, 445 (1944), with CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, 4th ed., 170-175 (1957).
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by a majority of the Court even before Mackenzie was decided76
and has been referred to in several cases since then. 77 In Perez
it was expressly accepted as the basis for the decision by a fivejustice majority, and Warren, speaking for the minority, appeared also to accept the doctrine: "Generally, when congressional action is challenged, constitutional authority is found in
the express and implied powers with which the National Government has been invested or in those inherent powers that are
necessary attributes of a sovereign state." 18 Therefore, if the
question ever was in doubt, Perez clearly settles that the inherent power doctrine is firmly established in our constitutional·
law. As international relations become more complex, the doctrine may have an increasingly important role to play.
B. Majority and Minority Approaches Contrasted

Frankfurter's approach in Perez was essentially as follows:
Congress has inherent power to control foreign relations; that
power includes the right to regulate citizens voting in foreign
elections because such political activities may cause embarrassment to our government; expatriation bears a "rational
nexus" to solving this problem since the voter ceases to be a citizen after he votes and the United States can thus disclaim his
activities. If this approach is accepted, does the analysis stand
up?-Under the act the expatriating act is voting; it is not political
activity. Speech-making, electioneering, bribery, and all other
sorts of intermeddling will not cause loss of citizenship because
the statute has not so provided. 79 Since Mexico has adopted the
secret ballot, 80 the question then must turn not on the candidate
or political party supported, but on the naked fact that a ballot
was cast. Finally, since in expatriation questions the government
76 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 at 711-713 (1893). See also Clayton,
"The Evolution and Basis of Our Nationality," 24 N.J.L.J. 579 (1901). But see Quarles,
"The Federal Government: As to Foreign Affairs, Are Its Powers Inherent as Distinguished
From Delegated," 32 GEO. L.J. 375 at 381 (1944).
77 See discussion of the cases in Hurst, "Can Congress Take Away Citizenship?" 29
ROCKY .MT. L. REV. 62 at 67-72 (1956).
78 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 63 (1958). Emphasis added.
79 Were it so to provide, an interesting First Amendment problem would be raised.
While it may be presumed that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to
speak freely anywhere, and while voting itself may not be speech, it is arguable that
sanctions could not be imposed in this country by our laws for speech in other countries
which would ,be protected by the First Amendment if delivered here.
80 See Ley Electoral Federal, Capitulo VII, Seccion Segunda, Articulo 84 II, 189 DIARio
OFICIAL, Dec. 4, 1951, p. 11.
·
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has the burden of proof, 81 and since it put in no evidence on the
legality of petitioner's voting in Mexico, he would apparently
be entitled to assume for constitutional purposes that his voting
was authorized by Mexican law.82 The constitutional question
then is: does the fact of casting a ballot in a Mexican election
when permitted by Mexican law pose a sufficiently serious problem of embarrassment to our government to justify Congress
in determining that there is a rational nexus between expatriating the voter and the successful conduct of foreign policy? If
Mexico by her law gives an American the right to vote, it is
difficult to suppose a rational objection based solely on the exercise of the right so given. If it is argued that Mexico might
irrationally object, a sufficient answer would seem to be that
Americans should not lose their citizenship because of the irrational conduct of foreign governments, and that it would be
irrational of Congress so to provide. Perhaps little else can
be said.83
Unlike Black's concurrence in Nishikawa, the Warren approach in Perez also seems to involve a "rational nexus" test,
directed however to an entirely different question. For Warren
the test would seem to be whether the congressional act bore
a reasonable relationship to a transfer of allegiance from this

Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
This, however, is not true. The Mexican Constitution provides: "Art. 35. The
prerogatives of citizens are: (1) To vote at popular elections; . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]
Art. 33. . .. "No alien may meddle in any way whatsoever in the political affairs of
the country." 2 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, 2d ed., 675 (1956). Although neither
the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals, (9th Cir. 1956) 235 F. (2d) 364, indicated
the parentage of petitioner, Clemente Martinez Perez, it is possible that his parents
were Mexican nationals. Were that true, he would also be of Mexican nationality
since Article 30 of the Mexican Constitution provides: "(A) The following are Mexican
by birth: ••. (II) Children born in foreign countries of Mexican parents; of Mexican
father and alien mother; of Mexican mother and unknown father." PEASLEE at 674. Thus
Perez would be a dual national. The constitutional question would therefore be substantially different. The exercise of political rights in a country in which petitioner
was already a citizen could indicate an acceptance of his obligations of citizenship in
that country inconsistent with continued allegiance to the United States within the
Warren test. Moreover, problems of statelessness would not be present. See note 104 infra.
83 Apparently the participation in the Saar plebiscite by German citizens who had
become naturalized Americans was the motivating force behind §40l(e). Perez v. Brownell,
356 U.S. 44 at 54. The House Report in which the section was originally (though unsuccessfully) proposed, however, revealed no embarrassment to our foreign relations by
suclr voting, but only a somewhat querulous objection that suclr conduct was improper.
H. Rep. 216, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935). The Report was implicitly directed at dual
nationals, in any case. The plebiscite might represent a situation, however, when voting
permitted to our citizens by Germany would embarrass our foreign relations, although
with France rather than with Germany.
81
82
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country. For example, he would probably uphold a statute providing for loss of citizenship· for voting in a foreign election in
which only citizens of that country could vote, at least if the
voter knew of this law, for his act would then indicate an allegiance to that country inconsistent with United States citizenship.84 The fact that the individual was subjectively completely
loyal to this country would be irrelevent.
Despite this superficial similarity of approach the two tests
rest on basically differing philosophies. For Frankfurter expatriation is merely one of a number of techniques available to
Congress for regulating or controlling or implementing any
of the many substantive powers which it possesses. Thus Congress may grant licenses, or provide a federal forum in which
to litigate, or expatriate, or set up an investigative committee,
if it feels that the chosen technique would implement its policy
in an area in which it has power. The Fourteenth Amendment
and Marshall's interpretation of the naturalization clause become relatively irrelevant, for the question is not one of substantive power, but of whether a regulatory technique is appropriate to its end.
Warren on the other hand sees expatriation as a substantive subject for legislation, such as bankruptcy, and for which
a specific grant of power must be found. Since use of the naturalization power and the Fourteenth Amendment, the only
readily available clauses from which the substantive power to
effect expatriation might be implied, has been foreclosed by
Osborn and Wong Kim Ark, he understandably can find permission to legislate in the area only from the somewhat fictitious
concept that by providing forfeiture of citizenship for acts
normally evidencing lack of allegiance, Congress is only recognizing the legal effect of the citizen's own voluntary renunciation.
Working from his premises, he is therefore allowing Congress
considerable discretion, 85 despite Frankfurter's charges of judicial intervention.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment

While the relevance of the Fourteenth Amendment has already been substantially discussed, one more comment might

84 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 at 75 (1958).
85 Compare Black's approach in Nishikawa, 356

U.S. 129 (1958).
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be pertinent. The question ultimately is whether the creation
of a status in absolute terms also carries with it the implication
that the status so created shall not be destroyed. The rest of the
Constitution does not seem to provide any other particularly
useful analogy. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "All persons
born . . . in the United States . . . are citizens of the United
States...." It could undoubtedly be argued that after the decision in Perez, Perez was a person born in the United States who,
by congressional mandate, was no longer a citizen of the United
States, and that this was in violation of the express terms of the
amendment. On the other hand, it could be countered that the
amendment merely made clear a person's status when he was
"born," and was intended to have no other effect. Apparently all
would agree that either formulation would include an exception
for truly voluntary expatriation. The question then, if viewed in
this light, is whether the amendment has continuing application
to the person, or whether it operates once at the moment of
birth, and then is spent. The difficulty, of course, is that the
amendment was drafted primarily (1) to make the newly liberated Negroes into citizens and (2) to make it clear that citizenship was primarily a federal matter. 86 The problem of expatriation was apparently not considered.
D. Whittaker's Position
Justice Whittaker's position is somewhat difficult to assess.
In his Memorandum in Perez he expressly accepted the Frankfurter approach. Yet he also joined without qualification the
Warren opinion in Trop in which Warren reasserted his thesis
advanced in Perez. Further, although accepting the Frankfurter
approach in Perez, he dissented because he felt that since voting
in Mexican elections might be legal, such voting bore no rational
relationship either to the embarrassment of foreign relations or
to dilution of loyalty. The lack of relation to the latter is clear,
and Warren also made this point. The lack of relation to the
former is not so clear. Brennan advanced the argument in his
concurring opinion in Trap that one evil of foreign voting was
that it might be taken as a representation of United States policy.87 If this is a major ground for finding embarrassment, it
86 Slaughter House
87 Trop v. Dulles,

Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 at 73 (1872).
356 U.S. 86 at 106 (1958).
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could be argued that we could disclaim illegal political activity
with greater ease than we could disclaim legal activity. 88 Thus,
Whittaker's distinction, while clearly supporting the Warren
rationale, does not so clearly support the Frankfurter rationale
which he purports to accept, but which he deserted in Trop.
All this may mean that Whittaker's position in future cases in
this area will be somewhat speculative.

E. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The arguments for finding expatriation a cruel and unusual
punishment have been set out thoroughly elsewhere and little
would be gained by repeating them here. 89 Two observations will
perhaps be helpful, however. The first is in relation to the dissent's opposition to this holding in Trop by the majority opinion.
Frankfurter there observes,
"It seems scarcely arguable that loss of citizenship is
within the Eighth Amendment's prohibition because disproportionate to an offence that is capital and has been so
from the first year of Independence. Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged that
loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?" 00
Arguably, his rhetorical question is irrelevant. The problem is
not disproportionateness (although in some cases it may be) 91
but whether the punishment is "cruel and unusual." A punishment might well be the latter and still not be disproportionate.
For example, if one convicted of murder were sentenced to have
his ears cut off as his sole punishment, it could hardly be contended that this punishment would be disproportionate-it would
be lenient-but surely no one would doubt that it would also
be "cruel and unusual." Frankfurter makes another point that
is open to scrutiny:
"If loss of citizenship may constitutionally be made
the consequence of such conduct as marrying a foreigner,
and thus certainly not 'cruel and unusual,' it seems more
than incongruous that such loss should be thought 'cruel
ss This, of course, would not be true under the analysis made of tbe Frankfurter
approach, part III, B supra.
89 64 YALE L. J. Il64 at 1187-Il94 (1955).
90 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 125 (1958).
91 E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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and unusual' when it is the consequence of conduct that is
also a crime." 92
Is this the point, or is not the point rather that the Eighth
Amendment deals only with "cruel and unusual punishments,"
and that by its terms it simply is not applicable until a "punishment" is found? It is at least arguable that denationalization of
the woman who voted in a Canadian local-option election93 was
cruel and unusual in a meaningful sense, but that her difficulty
was that she must have proceeded under the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause, if :at all.
This introduces the second observation. It would seem that
some sanctions are inherently penal, regardless of the guise in
which they may appear. Thus, surely few would contend that
a death sentence was anything but a "punishment" within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The same argument could
be made as to long prison terms. 94 The argument would then run
that denationalization, termed a "drastic" consequence by Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Nishikawa, was sufficiently
severe, as well as arbitrary and capriciaus,95 to warrant being
classified as per se a criminal sanction. Since the Warren opinion
in Trap did not limit its finding of a violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the crime of desertion, forfeiture would seem
always to violate the Eighth Amendment when used as punishment.96 The result would be, of course, that denationalization
would be limited to cases where the act evidenced a change of
allegiance. No justice took this approach, but it would not seem
wholly frivolous.

F. Brennan's Position
Since Justice Brennan's switch from supporting the government in Perez to supporting the petitioner in Trap caused sec92 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 126 (1958).
93 See Roche, "The Loss of American Nationality-The

Development of Statutory
Expatriation," 99 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 25 at 54, note 164 (1950).
94 Imprisonment for civil contempt, though it could conceivably encompass many
years, would not seem to mitigate against this argument, for there imprisonment is to
compel future action rather than to punish past action.
95 Conceivably, denationalization could mean deportation leading to the status of a
political criminal in one case, and resulting in no inconvenience at all in another.
96 It might be argued that denationalization would not be "cruel and unusual" when
applied to one convicted of treason, but since treason would seem clearly to show a
"dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of citizen•
ship," denationalization could better be applied on that wholly separate ground.
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tion 40l(e) to be upheld while 40l(g) was found unconstitutional,
his opinion is of particular interest. He argued (I) that denationalization was penal, (2) that under the war power Congress
could deal with desertion, (3) that denationalization bears no rational relation to rehabilitation for it makes the deserter "an outcast," (4) that it does not deter since the death penalty applies to
desertion and is more severe, (5) that it is capricious, since it
applies to technical desertions, such as "deserting" to the front
in order to fight, which bear no relation to failure to bear arms
for your country. All but the fourth point seem to follow. The
difficulty with his argument there is that while the death penalty
was available,97 it was seldom imposed; 98 and this was undoubtedly common knowledge among the troops. It is therefore perfectly conceivable that the possibility of a five-year prison term
in the United States would be very welcome to a morally weak
soldier who felt he faced almost certain death in an impending
battle in a Pacific island jungle. Yet, might not Congress rationally suppose that, were such a soldier also to face automatic loss
of citizenship on conviction of desertion with its vague connotations of banishment and statelessness, the likelihood of his deserting might be lessened? This would at least seem to be permissible reasoning within the Frankfurter rationale, and in fact
four. of the five justices who comprised the majority in Perez
were so persuaded.
The status of Brennan's argument is interesting to consider
in view of the treatment of the point in the Warren opinion.
He stated:
"Section 40 I (g) is a penal law, and we must face the
question whether the Constitution permits the Congress
to take away citizenship as a punishment for crime. If it is
assumed that the power of Congress extends to divestment
of citizenship, the problem still remains as to this statute
whether denationalization is a cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment." 99
No other reference to this point upon which Brennan rested
his decision is found in the opinion. Perhaps nothing can be

97 See Art. 85, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 7OA Stat. 67 (1956), 10 U.S.C. (Supp.
V, 1958) §885.
98 See HUIE, THE EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK 6-12 (1954).
99 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 99 (1958).
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said, without givmg way to pure conjecture, other than that
Warren did not find it necessary to reach this point.100 One
factor does stand out, however. That is that the holding in Trop
does not command any majority rationale. The result was reached
only as a result of the combination of two minorities. This must
be contrasted with Perez where Frankfurter did speak for a
majority, so that, if the dissenters there are willing to accept
Perez as a basis for stare decisis, its "rational nexus" approach
must be regarded as stating the law.
G. Black's Concurring Opinion in Nishikawa
Why Justice Black put what are presumably his true views
as to the constitutional issues raised in an opinion which turned
solely on burden of proof is difficult to understand. Perhaps he
wanted to avoid their possible divisive influence in Perez and
Trop where they would have been relevant. At any rate they
seem in line with his somewhat doctrinaire stand for the individual in all Bill of Rights cases. His argument is certainly not unsupportable. The entire controversy culminating in the 1868
act was concerned with voluntary expatriation by the individual.
Osborn and Wong Kim Ark support it as does one interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it is perhaps more
straightforward than the fiction which Warren must resort to
in order to reach his position. It would involve, however, overruling at least two precedents, and it strongly asserts judicial
intervention.
H. The Future of Section 401(j)

The remand of Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey "for determination in light of Trop v. Dulles" is somewhat surprising since
Trop did not deal with section 40 l (j) and since its status was
expressly left open in Perez. Some dictum in Trop does bear
adversely on section 40l(j)'s constitutionality, however.
"[Section 40l(g)] is essentially like Section 40l(j) of the
Nationality Act, decreeing loss of citizenship for evading

100 On the other hand, since Justice Brennan did not reach the "cruel and unusual
punishment" question, his vote will be decisive if the question is raised subsequently
under a section involving "punishment" which bears a reasonable relationship to the
exercise of a substantive power.
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the draft by remaining outside the United States. This provision was also before the Court in Perez, but the majority
declined to consider its validity. While Section 40l(j) decrees loss of citizenship without providing any semblance
of procedural due process whereby the guilt of the draft
evader may be determined before the sanction is imposed,
Section 40l(g), the provision in this case, accords the accused deserter at least the safeguards of an adjudication of
guilt by a court-martial." 101
While this observation about section 40l(j) is factually true,
it should be noted that in Mendoza-Martinez the Immigration
and Nationality Service started deportation proceedings only
after petitioner had been convicted of draft evasion.102 The
remand could have several meanings. Perhaps the most probable
is that the district court was expected to determine if the sanction was also penal as in Trop. The purpose of the remand may
be to determine more facts to see if the absence would show
a transfer of allegiance within Warren's test, which Frankfurter
would also accept as an additional ground for denationalization.
It might be to determine simply what was suggested in the
quoted dictum-whether petitioner had had a fair hearing on the
charge of departing the country to avoid military service-although this seems improbable in view of his conviction. The
section might raise a problem if interpreted both to be penal
so that the Eighth Amendment applied,1°3 and also to involve
a transfer of allegiance. It would seem that the Court could permissibly ignore the section to the extent it was a penal statute
and yet denationalize the individual under the section on the
wholly separate ground that his conduct showed a transfer of
allegiance.

101 Trop
102 Note

v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 94 (1958).
14 supra. That statute, however, attaches criminality to any person "who
shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duties," while §401G) and its successor,
§349(a)(l0) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [66 Stat. 267-268] apply to
persons who depart from or remain outside the United States "for the purpose of evading
or avoiding training and service in the military...." Since one could conceivably "knowingly fail" to register for the draft while outside the United States and yet remain outside
the United States for a "purpose" wholly apart from avoiding military service, conviction
under the first statute would not necessarily bring the individual under §401G). Compare
generally Ward v. United States, (5th, Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 441, revd. 344 U.S. 924 (1953),
with Vidales v. Brownell, (9th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 136, and Gonzales v. Landon, (9th
Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 955, revd. 350 U.S. 920 (1955).
103 See note 100 supra.
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CONCLUSION

In assessing these cases, it is difficult to disassociate the question of judicial abstention versus judicial intervention from
the substantive constitutional questions. As an original proposition, the nature of the early controversies, the debates in 1818,
the decisions in Osborn and Wong Kim Ark, the Fourteenth
Amendment, the inconclusiveness of Mackenzie and Savorgnan,
the failure of any statute until 1940 to provide unequivocally
for involuntary denationalization and the undesirability of statelessness104 make the Warren position in Perez preferable. Nevertheless, it can be argued that considerations of judicial policy
and of the proper relation of the Court to Congress properly
dictated the opposite result. Were only a degree question-one
of more or less-involved, the argument would be persuasive.
Here, however, differing constitutional theories were at stake:
is expatriation a regulatory technique which need bear only a
rational relationship to the exercise of a substantive power; or
is expatriation itself a substantive power requiring its own constitutional basis for exercise, failing which it can only be applied when the individual's acts approach voluntary expatriation.
This being true, it would seem that the Court could have accepted the latter constitutional position without being charged
with disregarding "the constitutional allocation of governmental
functions."
Robert ]. Hoerner, S.Ed.

104

See generally SECKLER-HUDSON, STATELESSNESS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
UNITED STATES (1934); WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127

(1956).

